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I. INTRODUCTION
A considerable number of studies have shown that earnings inequal-
ity of workers around the world has widened with the onset of
globalization, and that rising wages of skilled workers relative to unskilled
workers is an important cause of this increase in inequality. Various expla-
nations exist for the rising relative wages of the skilled to unskilled
workers in Asia, Latin America, and the United States during the 1980s
and 1990s. Most authors believe that changes in the demand for labor fa-
voring the skilled contribute more to such wage inequality than do
changes in the supply of skilled or unskilled labor, but there is still much
controversy as to what is driving the changes in demand. Some claim trade
liberalization is the primary force (offering mechanisms other than those
proposed in the Hecksher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuleson models),
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whereas others point to skill-biased technical change,' which can be
driven by trade2 or by foreign direct investment.3
Costa Rica was no exception to this trend of globalization and in-
creasing earnings inequality. Earnings inequality rose from 1992 to
1999, as the country introduced trade liberalization and other structural
adjustment reforms. Gindling and Trejos show that one of the most im-
portant measurable causes of the rise in earnings inequality in Costa
Rica was an increase in returns to education (skill). Robbins and
Gindling show that the increase in relative wages for skilled workers in
Costa Rica was most likely due to changes in the relative demand for
more skilled workers and is coincident with trade liberalization.5
Gindling and Trejos, however, also show that a significant part of the
change in earnings inequality in Costa Rica cannot be explained by
measurable factors such as changes in education, hours worked, sector of
employment, or region of residence.6
We argue in this paper that the institution of the minimum wage is
also an important factor in explaining changes in earnings inequality in
Costa Rica, and that it can be an important factor in many developing
countries. This study is a departure from the literature on institutions and
development, which tends to analyze the impact of a more generally de-
fined set of institutions using data on a number of countries. In this paper
we analyze detailed changes in one institution in one country, using
panel data over time. We argue that it is important to understand how
institutions are structured when trying to measure their impact.
How might minimum wages impact the dispersion of wages paid in
a country? In countries, such as the United States, where there is only
one minimum wage that is considered to be the floor for all wages, one
1. See Eli Berman, John Bound & Stephen Machin, Implications of Skill-biased Tech-
nological Change: International Evidence, 113 Q. J. ECON. 1245 (1998); DAVID CARD &
JOHN E. DINARDO, SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND RISING WAGE INEQUALITY:
SOME PROBLEMS AND PUZZLES, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8769,
2002), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8769; Robert Feenstra & Gordon H. Hanson, Global-
ization, Outsourcing and Wage Inequality, 86 AM. ECON. REV., 240 (1996).
2. See NINA PAVCNIK, ANDREAS BLOM, PINELOPI GOLDBERG & NORBERT SCHADY,
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND WAGE AND INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL, (World Bank, Policy Re-
search Working Paper No. 2982, 2003).
3. See Feenstra & Hanson, supra note 1; Agnieszka Skuratowicz, Effects of FDI on
Wage Inequalities in Poland: Theory and Evidence (August 2000) (unpublished paper, Katho-
lieke Universiteit Leuven), at http://www.ires.ucl.ac.be/Iresnet/Research/Axe3/site2000/
Matagne/Skuratowicz.pdf.
4. See T.H. GINDLING & JUAN DIEGO TREJOS, ACCOUNTING FOR CHANGING EARN-
INGS INEQUALITY IN COSTA RICA, 1980-1999, (UMBC Dep't Econ., Working Paper No. 03-
108, 2003), at http://www.umbc.edu/economics/ wpapers/wp_03_108.pdf.
5. See Donald Robbins & T. H. Gindling, Trade Liberalization and the Relative Wages
of More-Skilled Workers in Costa Rica, 3 REV. DEv. ECON. 140 (1999).
6. See Gindling & Trejos, supra note 4.
[Vol. 26:245
Minimum Wages
might expect to see dispersion rise as the floor falls. DiNardo, Fortin,
and Lemieux show that the erosion of the real value of the minimum
wage contributed to rising wage inequality in the United States in the
1980s. In countries, however, where there is more than one minimum
wage, one should take into account changes in the whole structure of
minimum wages when looking at the effects of minimum wages on wage
inequality. Costa Rica is such a country and, as seen in Table 1, there are
at least 40 other countries that have multiple minimum wages set by dif-
ferent dimensions (such as occupation, industry and region). For
example, in Argentina there are dozens of minimum wages for agricul-
tural workers (set by region, activity and occupation) and one wage for
all other economic activities. In Mexico there are 267 minimum wages
(set by three geographic areas and 88 occupations, plus one general
minimum wage for each area). In Brazil there were 39 regional mini-
mum wages from 1963-1984.' Studies9 that only use one minimum wage
to examine the impact of minimum wage on wage inequalities in these
countries may provide biased estimates of the effect.
We proceed in Part 2 of the paper to review the findings in previous
studies of wage inequality in Costa Rica. In Part 3 we describe the insti-
tution of minimum wages and our expectations about the impact of these
mandated changes on the distribution of minimum wages. In Part 4 we
describe the data set and provide descriptive statistics on changes in the
inequality of minimum wages (and wages) over the 1987-1997 period.
We form hypotheses as to how the changes in the structure of minimum
wages might affect the distribution of wages and test them in Part 5. Part
6 concludes with a discussion of the findings.
II. WAGE INEQUALITY AND LIBERALIZATION IN COSTA RICA
As shown by Gindling and Trejos, earnings inequality in Costa Rica
declined from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s and then began to rise.'
More specifically, Costa Rica experienced a sharp decline in inequality
over the 1976-1986 period, a slight decline in the 1987-1992 period and
a sharp increase in the 1992-1999. Using a three-year moving average,
7. See John DiNardo, Nicole M. Fortin & Thomas Lemieux, Labor Market Institutions
and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach, 64 ECONOMETRICA
1001 (1996).
8. See ILO., Labor Law & Labor Relations Branch, Briefing Notes, at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/govlab/ legrel/papers/index.htm.
9. See, e.g., Willy W. Cortez, What is Behind Increasing Wage Inequality in Mexico?,
29 WORLD DEV. 1905 (2001); Linda A. Bell, The Impact of Minimum Wages in Mexico and
Colombia, J. LAB. ECON. S102 (1997).
10. See GINDLING & TREJOS, supra note 4.
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the variance of log earnings fell by -0.113 in the first period, -0.043 in
the second period and it rose by 0.072 in the third period. Gindling and
Trejos show that the most important measurable factor underlying this
pattern of earnings inequality is the changing returns to education, which
fell over the 1976-1987 period and rose thereafter."
The rise in the returns to education and earnings inequality coincides
with, but is not entirely inclusive of, the period of liberalization. Starting
in the mid 1980s, Costa Rica, along with its Latin American neighbors,
began to liberalize trade and open its capital accounts. Costa Rica im-
plemented trade liberalization in an explicitly gradual manner. Although
a new Central American Common Market tariff regime was agreed to in
1985, tariff reductions began only in 1987 and were allowed a five-year
adjustment period. At the same time, explicit subsidies were put into
place for certain exports (in apparel, electronic assembly, and non-
traditional agriculture). In the 1990s, tax credits for non-traditional ex-
ports moved toward more high-technology products and tourism as
subsidies were reduced for labor-intensive manufacturing exports. All
controls on the capital account were removed by 1993 when the Costa
Rican government began to aggressively pursue foreign direct invest-
ment.
Gindling and Trejos conclude that the increase in the returns to edu-
cation from 1987 to 1999 was caused by both supply and demand
factors.'2 Robbins and Gindling's results suggest that relative supply
movements were sufficient to explain relative wage changes before 1985
but not after 1987, the beginning of the trade liberalization. 3 They con-
clude that the increase in demand for more educated workers was most
likely due to skill-biased technical change, possibly accelerated by skill-
enhancing trade following substantial trade liberalization.
Most observers would argue that the increase in inequality is not
likely the result of reduction of labor protection because, like many of its
Latin American neighbors, Costa Rica did not liberalize the labor market
in this period. In fact, following a long tradition of protecting its workers
with measures such as universal health care and pension benefits, the
government passed a law in 1990 that required parity of wages between
men and women. As we show below, in 1987 the government did em-
bark on a gradual reform of the minimum wage structure, which we
hypothesize counters the wage disequalizing effect of trade liberalization
for part of the period.
11. See id.
12. See id..
13. See Robbins & Gindling, supra note 5.
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III. MINIMUM WAGE SETTING
The 1949 Constitution of Costa Rica establishes that every worker
has the right to a minimum wage that provides a decent standard of liv-
ing. Further legislation on wage fixing sees minimum wages as a means
of promoting a fair distribution of income. The standard of living objec-
tive has been pursued through a continuous process of comparing the
purchasing power of minimum wages in relation to different baskets.
The income distribution objective has been explicitly pursued in times of
severe crises.
According to Law 832, minimum wages should be adjusted every
year, the new rates being valid from January first. The body responsible
for carrying out this work is the National Salaries Council (CNS), a tri-
partite structure of nine members elected every four years.' 4 The Council
decides the minimum wage increases (by simple majority voting of its
members). In addition to this annual fixation, minimum wages can be
revised at any time during the year following a request of five employers
or fifteen workers. Although the law institutes this alternative as an ex-
ception, it has been used often to compensate for high inflation rates
since 1980. Since 1980, minimum wages have been adjusted twice a
year, the only exception being 1983 when they were adjusted three
times.
In 1987, at the beginning of the period under study, there were 520
separate minimum wage rates, which were set by occupation/skill and
industry. As the cumbersome nature of this system was becoming in-
creasingly apparent, some members of the CNS proposed merging
minimum wages for similar occupations under more generic titles. This
process, which we describe below, started in 1988 and within five years
the CNS managed to reduce the number of minimum wages to seventy-
two; by 1997 they were reduced to the nineteen minimum wages that we
observe today.'-
In 1987, all individuals who worked in the private sector were as-
signed to a minimum wage category that was defined by a detailed
industry and occupational classification. The industrial categories do not
14. Of these three groups, the representatives of the government have the most influ-
ence, and the relative bargaining power of the representatives of the government has increased
since initiation of the first Structural Adjustment Plan in the mid-1980s. Interview with Josd
Pablo Carvajal, Director, National Salaries Council (May 16, 2002).
15. For part-time workers the minimum wage is applicable proportionally. In principle,
young workers are subject to the same various minimum wage rates as older workers. How-
ever, Law 4903 of 1975 enables enterprises to hire entrants to the labor market below 21 years
of age for apprenticeships. The objective of this program has been to facilitate the entrance of
young workers to the labor market during periods of crisis. Although used extensively in the
1980s, the mechanism has not been used much in the 1990s as unemployment rates were low.
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correspond to the Standard Industrial Classification of the International
Labor Organization (ILO), but the aggregated one-digit categories are
similar: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity,
commerce, transportation and communication, and services. Within each
of these categories there could be several subcategories (e.g., in
manufacturing there were forty-four subcategories.) The occupa-
tional/skill categories were specific to the industry, and they too do not
correspond to the ILO's standard classification for occupations. They
roughly corresponded, however, to: supervisor, skilled employees, and
unskilled workers. For individuals with higher education (professionals),
there was a separate set of fourteen minimum wages by type of occupa-
tion, irrespective of the industrial characteristic of the job (e.g.,
librarians, nurses, accountants, laboratory technicians, and drafters). Fi-
nally, another minimum wage was set for all workers who had at least a
five-year university degree (licenciado), the most common terminal uni-
versity degree in Costa Rica at the time.
Beginning in 1988, the Ministry of Labor began a gradual process of
reducing the number of minimum wage categories for non-university
educated workers by eliminating the variation in wages given by the in-
dustrial dimension. Specifically, the ministry identified a broadly-
defined occupational (skill) category that was to be harmonized across
industries and proceeded gradually to increase the lower(est) minimum
wage by a greater amount than the higher(est) minimum wage within
each occupational category. For example, in January 1995, minimum
wages were decreed for only five (one-digit level) industries: mining,
manufacturing, construction, and electricity were collapsed into one
category. The number of wages within each industrial category was also
reduced to a total of only fifty-four wages (for employees with less than
a university degree). Over a period of several years, one minimum wage
emerged for each broadly-defined skill/occupation, irrespective of indus-
try. By the middle of 1997, the industrial dimension of the minimum
wage was completely eliminated.
While the number of minimum wages for the non-university edu-
cated workers was being reduced, the number of minimum wages for
workers with higher education became more numerous. In 1993, a new
minimum wage was set for individuals with two to three years of univer-
sity education (diplomados) and for graduates of five-year technical high
schools (ticnicos). In 1997, another new minimum wage was added for
workers with a four-year university degree. Prior to 1993, the minimum
wage applying to workers at these education levels was the same as the
minimum wage applying to less-educated workers in the same industry
and occupation. Therefore, the addition of minimum wage categories for
[Vol. 26:245
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these workers with higher education should have increased the minimum
wage for these workers, increasing the gap between the wages of work-
ers with higher education and workers without higher education, while at
the same time reducing the gap between the wages of licenciados and
other workers with higher education.
Beginning in June 1997, there were a total of nineteen minimum
wages, four for non-professionals (one each for unskilled workers, semi-
skilled workers, skilled workers, specialized workers), nine for profes-
sionals and six for special categories (e.g., live-in domestics, stevedores,
journalists).
Table 2 summarizes the changes in the level of minimum wages
from 1987 to 1997. It shows that there is a range of rate changes every
six months, reflecting the harmonization process. Based on the changes
described in this table and in the above paragraphs, we would expect:
(1) a reduction in the inequality of minimum wages among workers
without higher education as the number of minimum wages for this
groups is reduced over the 1987-1997 period and the lowest minimum
wages were raised more than the highest minimum wages in the har-
monization process, (2) an increase in the gap between the minimum
wage of workers with higher education and the minimum wage of work-
ers without higher education as the minimum wage for workers with
technical degrees, two-year and four-year university degrees are added in
1993-1997, and (3) a reduction in the inequality of minimum wages
among workers with higher education in the 1993-1997 period as the
minimum wage of workers with technical degrees, two-year and four-
year university degrees increases relative to the wages of workers with a
licenciado degree. We first test whether these patterns indeed exist in the
data.
IV. DATA
In our analysis we use annual data on legal minimum wages, from
decrees published by the Ministry of Labor, and on workers, from the
annual Household Surveys for Multiple Purposes carried out by the
Costa Rican Institute of Statistics and Census. The household surveys
have been conducted in July of every year since 1976 on approximately
1% of the population. We use data on approximately 10,000 workers
each year from 1987 to 1997, the period when minimum wages were
simplified.
We start with 1987 data because this is the year that the occupation
categories in the household surveys are sufficiently detailed to be able to
adequately match the detailed occupation/skill/industry categories in the
Fall 2004]
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minimum wage decrees. We use the three-digit occupational classifica-
tion available in the household survey, which is not equivalent to the ILO
standard classification. For illustration, we present in Table 3 the two-
digit occupational classification in the Costa Rican household survey.
From careful reading of the minimum wage laws published every year,
we assigned the minimum wage corresponding to each of these occupa-
tion/skill/industry categories.
The structure of legal minimum wages, weighted by the population
to which it applies, is depicted in Figure 1 with histograms of the mini-
mum wage distribution. The figure presents the distribution of real
minimum wages (in 1999 colones) among private sector workers who
report positive earnings in 1988 (at the start of the simplification) and in
1997 (at the end of the simplification process). Spikes in the distribution
of minimum wages represent legal minimum wages that apply to larger
proportions of workers. For example, starting from the left (the lowest
minimum wage) in the 1988 graph, the first spike is at the minimum
wage for domestic servants, who represent approximately 7% of all
workers and to whom applies a legal minimum wage of 123 colones (in
1999 prices) or $0.43 (in 1999 U.S. dollars) per hour. There are no
minimum wages over a large range of possible wages between the
minimum wage for domestic servants and the next minimum wage,
which is for unskilled workers (peones and other production workers) in
most industries. This second spike represents over 20% of all workers.
Next there is a cluster of many minimum wages that surround two
smaller spikes at the minimum wages for operators of machinery and
specialized workers (supervisors) in most industries. Finally, at the very
right of the distribution of minimum wages (after numerous very small
spikes) is a spike at the minimum wage of 578 colones or $2.00 per hour
(in 1999 prices) set for licenciados (five-year university graduates) who
represent approximately 2% of all workers.
The second graph in Figure 1 presents the distribution of (the log of)
real minimum wages among workers who report positive earnings for
1997. A comparison of the graphs for 1988 with the graphs for 1997 il-
lustrates the changes in the structure of legal minimum wages. As in
1988, the spike at the far left of the 1997 distribution of wages is at the
minimum wage for domestic servants (which again represents approxi-
mately 7% of workers) and the second spike occurs at the minimum
wage for unskilled workers. We can see that the simplification and con-
solidation process, however, between 1988 and 1997 compressed the
distribution of minimum wages around the unskilled wage: while in
1988 the spike at the unskilled minimum wage represented 20% of
workers, in 1997 the minimum wage for unskilled workers applied to
[Vol. 26:245
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45% of workers. At the same time that the minimum wages for unskilled
workers were being compressed, new minimum wage categories for
workers with higher education were added, resulting in several new
spikes at higher wage levels, including a spike at the minimum wage for
four-year university graduates (4% of workers) and at the minimum
wage for licenciados (2%).
In Figure 2, we plot the ratio of the average minimum wage for more
educated workers to the average minimum wage for less educated work-
ers, where more educated refers to workers with higher education
(technical high school and university) and less educated refers to work-
ers with less than a technical high school education. The resulting graph
clearly shows that there was an increase in the gap between the mini-
mum wage of workers with higher education and the minimum wage of
workers without higher education as the minimum wage for workers
with technical degrees and two-year and four-year university degrees
were added in 1993-1997.
In Figure 3, we plot the standard deviation of the log of minimum
wages, SD(lnMW), for all workers and by more or less education. It
shows that, as expected: (1) there was a reduction in the SD(lnMW)
among workers without higher education as the number of minimum
wages for this groups is reduced over the 1987-1997 period and
(2) there was a reduction in the SD(lnMW) among workers with higher
education in 1993-1997 as the minimum wage of workers with technical
degrees and two-year and four-year university degrees increases relative
to the wages of workers with a licenciado degree. Facts (1) and (2)
caused the SD(InMW) for all workers to fall from 1987 to 1992, but the
increase in the gap between the more and less educated, shown in Figure
2, caused the SD(lnMW) for all workers to rise from 1992-1997.
The plots in Figure 4 of the standard deviation of the log of wages
show that as the dispersion of minimum wages changed, so did the dis-
persion or inequality of actual wages. Figures 2 through 4 and the
summary measures provided in Appendix Table Al appear to indicate
that changes in the inequality of legal minimum wages are correlated
with the change in the inequality of actual wages. For example, as the
inequality of minimum wages for workers with and without higher edu-
cation fell from 1987 to 1997, so did the inequality of actual wages.
Further, as the standard deviation of the log of minimum wages for all
workers fell from 1987 to 1992, so did the standard deviation of the log
of actual wages for all workers. Then, as the standard deviation of mini-
mum wages rose from 1987 to 1992, so did the standard deviation of
actual wages. Note that changes in the inequality of actual hourly wages
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do not appear to be closely correlated with the change in the average or
minimum legal minimum wage.
These results suggest four questions (hypotheses): (1) Did the in-
crease in the gap between the minimum wages of workers with and
without higher education cause the gap between the actual wages of
workers with and without higher education to increase (and therefore
cause an increase in wage inequality)? (2) Did the reduction in the ine-
quality of minimum wages for workers without higher education cause a
reduction in the inequality of actual wages for these workers? (3) Did the
reduction in the inequality of minimum wages for workers with higher
education cause a reduction in the inequality of actual wages for these
workers? (4) Did changes in the dispersion of minimum wages cause
changes in the dispersion of actual wages? We test these hypotheses in
the next part.
V. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN MINIMUM WAGE
STRUCTURE ON WAGE INEQUALITY
To test the above hypotheses, we pool the individual data on all sala-
ried workers in the private sector for the 1987 to 1997 years and create
panel data for seven industries' 6 Using this data set, we estimate the fol-
lowing equation (equation (1)) with industry fixed effects:
T
'n"Skilled 
-- Unskilled la + a InOW Skilled / kfiUnskilled . + E yt YR + pi W.
Here the dependent variable, ln(Wskiled /W.i skiled) is the log of the
ratio of the average real hourly wage of skilled workers to the average
real wage of unskilled workers in industry i at time t (1987 ... 1997).The vaia le ln M W Skilled / - Unskilled
The variable ln(MWi MWit ) is the log of the ratio of the av-
erage minimum wage for skilled workers to the average minimum wage
for unskilled workers in each industry in each year. We use the term
"skilled" to refer to workers with higher education (technical high school
and above) and by "unskilled" we refer to workers without higher educa-
tion. The coefficient a, is an estimate of the impact of the ratio of the
minimum wages on the ratio of actual wages of skilled to unskilled work-
ers. A positive and statistically significant coefficient (a,) would provide
evidence in support of the first hypothesis: the increase in the gap be-
tween the minimum wages of workers with and without higher education
causes the gap between the actual wages of workers with and without
16. Public sector workers are excluded from the analysis since their wages are governed
by a different set of decrees. The seven industries are: agriculture, manufacturing, construc-
tion, commerce, transportation, communication, and services.
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higher education to increase. We estimate the equation using industry
fixed effects to control for unobserved differences across industries. To
control for year-specific factors such as changes in aggregate supply and
aggregate demand and the timing of minimum wage changes, we include
a dummy variable for each year, YR,.
The results of the estimation of equation (1) are reported in Table 4.
We find that the coefficient a, is positive and statistically significant
(specifically, it is equal to 0.632 with a standard error of 0.156). Thus,
our results provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that the in-
crease in the gap between the minimum wages of workers with and
without higher education caused the gap between the actual wages of
workers with and without higher education to increase.
To test hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate the following equation
(equation (2)), separately for workers with and without higher education
and for all workers combined:
T
SD(ln W.,)= / + /,[SD(ln MWa,)]+ T 
+
where the dependent variable is a measure of inequality, i.e., the standard
deviation of the log of the real hourly wage (in 1999 colones) in industry
i at time t (1987 to 1997); SD(InMW,) is the standard deviation of the log
of real minimum wages in each industry in each year. We include year
dummies and estimate the equation with industry fixed effects to control
for unobserved differences between industries. The coefficient fl, is an
estimate of the impact of changes in the variance in the legal minimum
wage on the variance of actual wages. A positive and significant coeffi-
cient /, would provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that changes
in the inequality of minimum wages cause changes in the inequality of
actual wages.
The results of the estimates of equation (2) are also reported in Table
4. In the equation estimated using data on workers without higher educa-
tion, the coefficient fl, is positive (0.432) and significant. In the equation
estimated with data on workers with higher education, the coefficient ,
is also positive (0.817) and significant. These results provide evidence in
support of the hypothesis that the reduction in the inequality of mini-
mum wages for workers with and without higher education caused a
reduction in the inequality of actual wages for each of these categories
workers. In the equation estimated using data on both workers with and
without higher education, the coefficient /J, is positive (0.245) but not
significant.
The literature on the impact of minimum wages on inequality has
generally analyzed the impact of changes in the "minimum minimum
Fall 20041
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wage" (rather than the dispersion of minimum wages) on wage inequal-
ity. The argument generally made is that an increase in the minimum
minimum wage will increase the wages of the lowest-paid workers, and
therefore reduce the inequality of wages by truncating the left tail of the
distribution. To test this hypothesis, we estimate an equation (equation
(3)) similar to equation (2), but that includes the log of real minimum
minimum wage (lnMinMW,) as an independent variable rather than the
standard deviation of the log of minimum wages:
T
SD(lnW. )= 0 o+ /31ln MinMW, + Zy, ,YR, +,,.it t I
A negative and significant coefficient on the real minimum minimum
wage variable would provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that
an increase in the minimum minimum wage reduces inequality in actual
wages. We estimate this equation with data on all workers and less edu-
cated workers and present the results in Table 4. In both cases, the
coefficient on the real minimum minimum wage is positive and insig-
nificant. These findings allow us to reject the hypothesis that an increase
in the minimum minimum wage causes a reduction in inequality in ac-
tual wages in Costa Rica.
Finally, to examine the relative impacts of changes in the dispersion
and the levels of minimum wages, we estimate an equation (equation
(4)) that includes both the standard deviation of the log of the minimum
wage and the real value of the minimum minimum wage as independent
variables:
TSD(lnWit)=,80 + flSD(lnMW )+ 3 21n MinMWlt + X yYR +Pi,itit t=J
In Table 4, we present the coefficient estimates of fl and f/ from es-
timating equation (4) using data for all workers and for less educated
workers, separately. These estimated coefficients confirm our previous
results. That is, they provide evidence that changes in the dispersion of
minimum wages are positively and significantly correlated with the
changes in the dispersion of the wages of workers without higher educa-
tion, while changes in the real minimum minimum wage do not have
statistically significant effects on the dispersion of wages. This finding is
important since many studies use the level of the minimum wage as an
explanatory factor in their analysis of the rising skilled to unskilled wage
ratio over time. 7 Whereas the minimum wage can increase the average
17. See Cortez, supra note 9; Bell, supra note 9.
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wage, it is not clear that it should reduce dispersion. And when only one
minimum wage is used in cases when there are multiple minimum wage
(as in the case of studies of Mexico, e.g. Bell, 1997),' 8 then it is not sur-
prising that there are no significant results.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we show that Costa Rica experienced rising wage ine-
quality in the 1990s, during the period when it opened its economy to
global forces. We know from Robbins and Gindling that the rise in the
relative wages of more skilled workers in Costa Rica could be attributed
in part to rising demand for more skilled workers due to trade liberaliza-
tion.' 9 Work by Gindling and Trejos finds a number of other factors that
can also help explain rising earnings inequality (including changes in the
levels or supply of education) but notes that a large part of the change in
inequality cannot be explained by variables such as education, gender,
region, hours worked, or job characteristics.2°
In this paper, we test whether minimum wage legislation is part of
the missing story. Our examination of Costa Rica's complex minimum
wage structure and its dynamics suggested three hypotheses: (1) the in-
crease in the gap between the minimum wages of workers with and
without higher education cause the gap between the actual wages of
workers with and without higher education to increase (and therefore
cause an increase in wage inequality); (2) the reduction in the inequality
of minimum wages for workers without higher education cause a reduc-
tion in the inequality of actual wages for these workers; and (3) the
reduction in the inequality of minimum wages for workers with higher
education cause a reduction in the inequality of actual wages for these
workers. We find that the evidence supports each of these three hypothe-
ses.
The level of minimum minimum wage was not found to be impor-
tant in affecting the dispersion of wages. It was expected that the
minimum minimum wage would truncate the left tail of the earnings dis-
tribution and as such lower inequality. In a complex system, however,
such as that in Costa Rica (or Mexico or Argentina), it is not clear the
either the minimum minimum wage or the average minimum wage
should affect the distribution since there are a multitude of wages that
can affect the distribution at higher levels. Nevertheless, since many
18. See Bell, supra note 9.
19. See Robbins & Gindling, supra note 5.
20. See GINDLING & TREJOS, supra note 4.
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studies have used this variable in trying to explain changes in earnings
inequality, we thought it worthwhile testing for it as well.
In sum, the structure of minimum wages matters, and we found it
contributes to wage inequality in Costa Rica. This suggests that countries
with an interest in mitigating inequality arising from trade liberalization
have the levers to do so with a multiple minimum wage policy. In Costa
Rica, the reduction in the inequality of legal minimum wages from 1987
to 1992 contributed to a decline in actual wage inequality, mitigating the
disequalizing impact of the trade liberalization (found by Robbins and
Gindling, 1999).2" When the addition of legal minimum wages for uni-
versity-educated workers in 1993 increased the gap between the
minimum wages of workers with and without higher education, however,
changes in the structure of minimum wages contributed to an increase in
wage inequality.
21. See Robbins & Gindling, supra note 5.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
COUNTRIES WITH MORE THAN ONE MINIMUM WAGE
IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Trainee,
Appren. or Marital Job
Country Region OCC IND Youth Status Tenure or
1 Australia x x
2 Argentina x
3 Barbados x
4 Belize* x
5 Benin x
6 Brazil (before 1984) x
7 Burma** x
8 Burundi x x
9 Cambodia" x x
10 Canada x
11 Central African Republic x x
12 China** x
13 Cuba x
14 Czech Republic x x
15 Equitorial Guinea** x
16 Ethiopia** x
17 Fiji* x
18 Finland x
19 The Gambia x
20 Greece" x x x
21 Guinea-Bissau x
22 Honduras x x
23 India x x
24 Indonesia x
25 Iran x x
26 Italy x
27 Ivory Coast x
28 Japan x x
29 Jordan
30 Luxembourg x. x x
31 Malawi* x
32 Malaysia** x x
33 Mauritius x x I
Fall 2004]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Trainee,
Appren. or Marital Job
Country Region OCC IND Youth Status Tenure or
34 Mexico x x
35 Morocco* x
36 Mozambique* x
37 Nepal x x
38 Nicaragua x
39 Niger x
40 Pakistan x
41 The Philippines x x
42 Rwanda x
43 Spain x
44 Sri Lanka x
45 Swaziland x
46 Togo x
Total 16 17 22 4 2 2
* Only 2 minimum wages
** Does not apply to all regions, occupations, or sectors
Sources:
International Labor Organization, Labour Law and Labour Relations
Branch's Briefing Notes: the following website: http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/dialogue/govlablegrel/papers/index.htm.
Index of Economic Freedom, 2004. The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street
Journal http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.html.
OECD, 1998, "Making the Most of the Minimum: Statutory Minimum
Wages, Employment and Poverty," in Employment Outlook, 1998.
Wailes, Nick and Russel D. Lansbury, 1999, "Collective bargaining and
flexibility: Australia," ILO IFP/DIALOGUE Working Paper Series,
1999.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES
COSTA RICA 1987-1997
1987 Over 500 different minimum wage categories within 10 major industry
categories (agriculture, minining, manufacturing, construction,
electricity, commerce, transportation, communications, services, and
professionals.) The professional category includes a minimum wage
for anyone with a "licenciado," a 5-year university degree (more
common than a 4-year bachelors degree.) The other professional
minimum wages are for specific professions (and not for anyone with a
_2-yeS r 4.ye.ar de. ........ .. ..........
M.W. From To Raise
January 1-August 29 0.00 267.00c 9.00%
267.50 307.80o 7.50%
307.850 344.50o 5.5%
More than
344.50c 3.50%
-----------------------------------------------------
August 30-December 31 312.800 0.000 4.00%
312.850 322.900 3.00%
More than
322.950 2.50%
1988 Beginning in 1988 the Ministry of Labor began a gradual process of
reducing the number of minimum wage categories. To do this, the
Ministry identified two or more categories that were to be combined
and increased the minimun wage in the category with the lowest
minimum wage by a greater amount than the minimum wage in the
higher wage category. In this way, over a period of several years, the
minimum wage for these categories would become the same.
Therefore, for each category in each year minimum wages are
increased by different amounts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
January 1-August 15 As part of the process of gradually consolidating minimum wage
categories, for each category minimum wages were increased by
different absolute amounts: the range is 3.5-15.0%. The average
increase was 11.0%.
August 16-December31 Increases of 8.85% for the lowest salaries down to 2.3% for the
highest salaries, with exception for domestic servants (9.16%).
Average increase 5.64%.
1989
January 1-September-1 6 - Increases from 4.76% to 16.81%. Average increase was 12.16%.
September 17-December 31 Increases from 3.41% to 8.88%. Average increase was 6.41%.
1990 The major industry categories of manufacturing, mining, electricity and
construction were combined. The number of minimum wage
_cateories is reduced to 60-70. Consolidation of cateodes continues._
January 1--July 31 Increases from 3.14% to 25.29%. Average increase was 9.91%.
August 1--December 31 Increases from 9.79% to 16.35%. Average increase was 13.47%
1991
- January 1-June23 ......... Increases from_2.11% to 15.67%. Average increase was 9.86%.
June 23-December 31 Increases from 5.03% to 17.3%. Average increase was 10.51%.
1992
SJanuary 1 -July 1 - Increases from_4%-to 26.69%. Average increase was 11.38% ......
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July 2-December 31 Increases from 12.02% to 13.89%. Average increase was 13.73%.
Exceptions: Domestic Servants, 18.72%, Private Accountants, 37.38%
and Journalists, 39.58%.
1993 Several categories are added for those with higher education. In
addition to the already existing minimum wage for "licenciados," legal
minimum wages are now set for those with 2-3 years of university
education ("diplomados" or "tecnicos") and for graduates of 5-year
technical high schools. ........................
January 1-July 26- --------- Increases from 4.88% to 14.58%. Average increase was 5.07%.
July 27-December 31 Increases from 4.65% to 6.37%. Average increase was 5.02%.
1994
January 1-July 30 Increases of 8.00% Agriculture
9.00% Other Activities
July 31-December 31 Increases of 9.00% Unskilled ag. Labor
in Palm Oil
10.00% Bus Drivers
42.86% 'Coyol" harvesters
8.00% All other activities
1995
January 1-August 9 Increases of 5.71% "Coyol" harvesters
10.00% All other activities
Augutst 1 0-December 31 Increases from 5.70% to 12.83%. Average increase was 9.69%.
1996
January 1-July 4 Increases from 38.08% to -17.78%. Average increase was 8.35%.
July 5-December 31 Increases from 8.54% to 7.95%. Average increase was 8.05%.
1997 The major industry categories were combined into one that specifically
includes agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, commerce,
tourism, services, transport, and warehousing. Within this combined
category four minimum wages are set, for unskilled workers, semi-
skilled workers, skilled workers, and specialized workers (supervisors).
Two other major categories remained: professionals and "specialis."
"Specials" included a minimum wage for domestic servants. Within the
professionals category a minimum wage was added for workers with a
4-year university degree. These changes resulted in only 19 different
minimum waqes being set in 1997.
January 1-July 4 Increases from 8 to 8.4%. Average increase was 8.35%.
July 5-December 31 Increases from 8.54% to 7.95%. Average increase was 8.05%.
Sources:
Ministry of Labor and Social Security, National Salary Council, De-
partment of Salaries, and interviews with Jose Pablo Carvajal (Director,
National Salary Council), July 14, 2003 and Orlando Garcia (Planning
Directorate, Ministry of Labor), July 15, 2003.
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TABLE 3
OCCUPATION CODES USED BY THE COSTA RICA'S NATIONAL
STATISTIC AND CENSUS INSTITUTE FOR THE MULTI-PURPOSE
HOUSING SURVEYS, FROM 1987 TO 2000.
Groups Description
0 Professionals and technicians
0"0 . Professonals and technicians in: architecture, urbanism, technical drawing,
engineering and industrial engineering technology,
01 Professionals and technicians in: chemistry, physic, astronomy, geology,
bacteriology and industrial laboratories.
02 Professionals and technicians in: agronomy and veterinary medicine,
biology, natural sciences, and agricultural technology.
03 Professionals and technicians in: medicine, surgery, dentistry, pharmacy,
medic technology, and paramedic and health activities.
04 Professionals and technicians in: arts, literature, sports, recreation,
communication, advertising, organization and social welfare.
05 Professionals and technicians in: reliious and cult activities.
06 Professionals and technicians in: teaching and research.
07 Professionals and technicians in: mathematics and statistics, economics,
business, accounting and social sciences.
08 Professionals and technicians in: law and jurisprudence.
09 Professionals and technicians in: maritime, fluvial and air transport and
communications.
... 1 ... irectors and_gen eralmanag ers -........................- -- - -
10 Directors and senior managers in the public administration (executive,
legislative and judicial powers).
11 Directors and managers in government institutions with total or partial
administrative independency and private enterprises: in agricultural and
industrial production and trade.
12 Directors and general managers in government institutions with total or
partial administrative independency and private enterprises in the service
industries.
2 Office clerks in the government and private enterprises
20- Office clerks and financial accountant employees in the government
(central, regional, local levels) and private enterprises.
21 Accounting and budget employees.
22 Employees in secretarial activities and transcription and reproduction of
texts.
23 Operators of computers and accounting equipments.
24 Employees in supervision, delivery and control of transport and
communication services.
25 Employees in mail and message distribution
26 Employees in the operation of radiotelephony, radiotelegraphy, and
telecommunication equipment.
27 Administrative employees in other services.
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Groups Description
3 Traders, retailers, wvholesalers and salespeson
.. .30 .. . Retailers -and/wholesalers. .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
31 Retail salespersons and salesmen on the streets.
32 Sale representatives - wholesale and manufacturing.
33 Other salespersons and sale agents, traders and commission agents4 Crop and animal farmers, and agricultural workers.
40 ~~~ ~~ ArctuaOvrer---- ---------------------------------40 gricultural Overseers
41 Crop and animal farmers (owners)
42 Agricultural workers
43 Fishers
44 Hunters and other workers in hunting.45 Forestry workers
5 Occupations related to driving, operating and controlling of
transportation vehicles.
- - - - - - - - - --- -- --- -- --- -- -- --- -- --- -- --
.. .5-0 D. riversof terest'rial'transport'vehi'cles.- 
. . . . . . . . . .
51 Railway conductor and stokers.
52 Conductors and crew of ships and others.
53 Operators of equipment of transit signals and controls.
6 Occupations in craft and manufacturing production of textiles and
clothing. Also, occupations in carpentry, bricklaying, painting,
Splumbing lchan c, and electricity.60 Textile workers.
61 Clothing production workers (except footwear, leather articles and related
-
_' goods).
62 Shoemakers, saddlers and related footwear workers
63 Carpenters, cabinetmakers and related wood workers.
64 Bricklayers, ceiling installers and other construction workers.
65 Painters of construction, vehicles, machinery, etc. (except painters and
- decorators of glass and ceramic).
66 Plumbers or other installers of pipes and metallic structures and welders in
general.
67 Electricians. Operators and repairers of electric and electronic installations
and equipment.
68 Mechanics and repairers of machinery in different sectors: agriculture,
manufacture, construction and transport.
69 Watchmakers, opticians, mechanics of precision; jewelers, silversmiths and
related workers of jewels and objects made of precious metals.
70
71
72
73
uccupations in craft and manufacturing production in graphic,
chemical, mining, metal smelting, food product and beverage, ceramic,
Seather,tobacco and other product industries.
Crafts persons and operators of graphic machines.
Miners, mining stonecutters, and operators of mining extraction machinery
Smelters, rolling mill operators and workers related to metal treatments.
Ceramists, potters and glass object producers.
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74 Workers and operators of machinery in chemical, wood, paperboard and
corrugated paper industries.
75 Workers and operators of machinery in food product and beverage
industries.
76 Workers in tobacco transformation and cigarette production.
77 Workers in tanneries and workers related to transformation of skins and
leathers.
78 Other crafts persons and machine operators.
8 Occupations in packing, loading, and storage .........
80 Workers in packing, loading and storage
9 Personal-services and related services. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
90 Workers in vigilance, protection and security
91 Cooks, maids, cleaners and occupations in food and beverage service.
92 Workers in laundry and ironing.
93 Doormen and building cleaners and managers.
94 Estheticians
95 Other workers in personal services.
98 People working in unidentified occupations.
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TABLE 4
REGRESSIONS OF INEQUALITY OF WAGES ON INEQUALITY
AND LEVEL OF MINIMUM WAGES.
Independent Variables
Minimum St. Dev. of
Wage Log of Real Real Min.
Sample: Dependent Variables: Ratio" MW MW
All Workers (1) Wage Ratio" 0.632'
(0.156)
(2) St. Dev. of In real wage 0.254
(0.205)(3) St. Dev. of In real wage 0.0001
-0.0002(4) St. Dev. of In real wage 0.253 0.0001
(0.207) (0.0002)
Less Educated Workers (5) St. Dev. of In real wage 0.432'
(0.166)(6) St. Dev. of In real wage 0.0001
-0.0002(7) St. Dev. of In real wage 0.438' 0.0001
(0.168) (0.0002)
Higher Educated Workers (8) St. Dev. of In real wage 0.817'
(0.256)
'Significant at the 1% confidence level
'Significant at the 10% confidence level
The regressions use 77 data points (10 years of data on 7 industries) and
is estimated with industry and time fixed effects.
-The ratio of the wage (or minimum wage) of workers with higher edu-
cation to the wage (or minimum wage) of workers without a higher
education
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FIGURE I
THE DISTRIBUTION OF LEGAL MINIMUM
WAGES AMONG WORKERS
1988 AND 1997
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FIGURE 2
AVERAGE MW OF HIGHER EDUCATED WORKERS
TO LESS EDUCATED WORKERS
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
FIGURE 3
STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE LOG OF MINIMUM WAGES
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TABLE AI
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE
MINIMUM WAGES AND WAGES
1987-1997
All Workers
Mean Real
real Min. Std. Std.
Min Min. Dev. of Dev. of
Wage' Wage' MW Wages
260.3 128.8 0.263 0.691
247.3 122.5 0.263 0.683
254.9 127.9 0.249 0.659
250.0 131.0 0.243 0.652
256.6 141.9 0.229 0.631
267.9 166.9 0.212 0.621
265.0 159.5 0.237 0.624
290.1 176.2 0.238 0.636
262.4 157.4 0.248 0.636
288.8 170.1 0.256 0.629
306.0 176.7 0.265 0.654
More Educated'
Std Std.
Dev. of Dev. of
MW Wages
0.382 0.808
0.373 0.748
0.346 0.702
0.398 0.710
0.368 0.700
0.394 0.733
0.262 0.698
0.272 0.683
0.249 0.666
0.257 0.675
0.241 0.701
Less Educated'
Std. Std.
Dev. of Dev. of
MW Wages
0.232 0.646
0.235 0.639
0.218 0.617
0.202 0.607
0.192 0.591
0.157 0.569
0.158 0.578
0.155 0.585
0.154 0.583
0.158 0.574
0.181 0.586
MW
Higher
Ed/MW
less ed
1.54
1.51
1.51
1.55
1.51
1.53
1.84
1.84
1.86
1.90
1.85
a'n 1999 colones
bMore educated refers to workers with a technical high school or univer-
sity degree; Less Educated refers to workers with less than a technical
high school or university degree.
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
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